Past Commentaries
          Current Commentary, 
          Review and Outlook
          September 28th, 1999
          
          To My Clients, Friends & Observers:
          
          There is a chill in the air as the sun sets. The leaves on the trees 
            and the stock symbols on my screen are turning from green to red. 
            We are doing our chores, getting our house in order, getting ready 
            for the fall. And, blessedly, all these things are seasonal.
          The chart for the DJIA shows a big, round, topping pattern from late 
            spring to date - cresting the end of July, dipping on the Fed rate 
            hike, cresting again to the August 25th highs, then coming down the 
            mountain a full 10%. Welcome to the correction. 
          We’ve been discussing the effects of higher oil prices here for the 
            last several commentaries. And we’ve been warning our business clients, 
            particularly those who are leveraged, to be wary of energy costs and 
            interest rates. Last week we participated in a conference call with 
            Raymond James’ energy analysts who are prognosticating natural gas 
            shortages and oil priced at mid-to-high $20’s by mid-2000. 
          Sure enough, consumer confidence, released this morning, has dropped 
            to a six-month low. And- poof! -almost as quickly as we got the bad 
            news, the president of Venezuela’s state oil company announced that 
            OPEC will probably agree to increase oil production in March. And 
            just as quickly, oil stocks and oil service stocks are down. A lot. 
          
          But then what isn’t lately? Every attempt at a buying rally has been 
            deluged by too-willing sellers. Advance/declines (breadth) continues 
            to be atrocious (negative). The dollar is off over 20% vs. the yen, 
            and off over 5% on the J.P. Morgan Index vs. 19 Currencies, which 
            is what happens when the Fed grows the money supply at double the 
            rate of GDP. 
          And then there’s gold, breaking through $309, up from its low of 
            $253. No comment other than to repeat what I’ve said for years, everyone 
            should own a little gold. 
          The worst outcome of bad news and fear would be a snowball effect 
            leading to a change in market psychology. As much oversupply of stocks 
            as there is, at high valuations, in the face of waning, or at least 
            skittish, demand, there is still a strong economy which will generate 
            just under 4% growth this year, and perhaps 2.9% in 2000. Even though 
            interest rates have risen the yield curve remains positive and that 
            confirms healthy economic growth. 
          Perhaps the most flagrant evidence of some sort of a top in the market 
            comes from an article in the August edition of the venerable Atlantic 
            Monthly. Right at the top of this years record indexes two scholars, 
            Glassman and Hassett, produced a wonderfully entertaining hypothesis 
            that the "Perfectly Reasonable Price" (PRP) for the Dow isn’t the 
            11,300 it was in mid-July, or the 10,200 it is today. No, the PRP 
            should really be 36,000. O.K…What else can you tell me? 
          Let us, the Perfectly Reasonable Investors, recall the words of a 
            true American hero, Cmdr. James Stockdale (Ross Perot’s VP running 
            mate) and ask, "Who are we and why are we here?" To help answer that 
            I reproduce here my letter to the Atlantic Monthly in response to 
            the vapors of Messrs. Glassman and Hassett. 
          To The Atlantic Monthly:
          The Glassman/Hassett theory on the Perfectly Reasonable Price (PRP) 
            for stocks is an entertaining and provocative exercise in discounting 
            cash flows. There has long been a compelling and overwhelming rationale 
            for equity investments, however the PRP study contains some assumptions 
            suitable only to an academic exercise and really should include some 
            caveats. The PRP exercise considers (1) U.S. market prices 
            in isolation and uses the last 200 years as forecast for the next 
            200, (2) assumes the market to be very inefficient, (3) 
            does not address the simplest issue of supply and demand - that something 
            is only worth what somebody is willing to pay for it, (4) ignores 
            statistical probabilities defined by market valuations to date, and 
            (5) does not examine incremental shifts in the forces of supply 
            and demand, which I would recommend requires careful demographic study 
            supported by fundamental economic analysis. 
          Item (1) Examining another equity index, the Japanese Nikkei 
            was valued over 40,000 in 1988 at a P/E of over 90. The Nikkei is 
            18,500 today, having staged a strong comeback in the last few months, 
            with a P/E of about 60. This while Japanese interest rates are near 
            zero. If present value is determined by the assumption of sustainable 
            cash flow then the question becomes how far out are you willing to 
            discount and how much risk might that entail? How far out was the 
            Nikkei discounted to merit support of a 90 P/E? Will the P/E be 90 
            or 30 in 2009? 
          Item (2) If 36,000 Dow were the PRP, it would already be there 
            in an efficient market. 
          Item (3) In financial analysis the two preferred methods are 
            net present value and internal rate of return, which account for compounding 
            of cash flows. The weakest method is the payback method which simply 
            shows how long until invested capital gets paid back. For an individual 
            investor the payback method is the acid test. Use the payback method 
            first and consider all dividends and interest as repayments of principal, 
            then consider whatever is left over after principal repayment as equity. 
            Then you can sweeten the picture with NPV or IRR with some reasonable 
            assumptions as to a discount and a time period. 
          Item (4) Using the historical sample data for P/E, E/P, and 
            Dividend Yield, even considering that the longer we remain at these 
            levels the more the mean will adjust, we are at the outer edges of 
            the bell curve and it is statistically improbable to sustain. Fundamental 
            economic analysis would support this statistical scenario. Corporate 
            earnings are driven by U.S. consumers, whose balance sheets are substantially 
            leveraged. Oil prices have doubled from their inflation-adjusted all-time 
            lows of last fall. This will diminish consumer expenditures on manufactured 
            goods and discretionary investment. A sustained market contraction 
            would hurt household balance sheets. Shrinkage in balance sheets and 
            income statements may degenerate consumer confidence and contract 
            consumer spending. Worst outcome would be a shift in investor psychology, 
            an issue unaddressed in the PRP theory. 
          Item (5) Indexes and statistics are beautiful things on paper 
            but the function of money is expenditure, and money is predicated 
            on investment liquidity. If a 60 year old widow started drawing 8% 
            a year from a $100,000 investment in the S&P 500 in 1971 she would 
            have nothing left in 1998, and she would be 87 years old. Of course 
            those were different times. What if they were our times? 
          Rising equity prices can be self-stimulated, i.e., stocks are bought 
            because they are going up. A stock breaks through its resistance level 
            on a chart and triggers a technical buy signal. Short sellers eventually 
            have to buy stock to cover and create upward price pressure, the reason 
            a big "short interest" statistic is bullish. Eventually trends become 
            exhausted as incremental changes in supply and demand, buying and 
            selling, accumulation and distribution occur. Look at momentum, the 
            rate of change of the rate of change, to identify the change. Support 
            it with other observation. New mutual fund cash flows from January 
            through April, reflecting retirement fund flows, increased at record 
            rates for four years until this year, when they failed to set a new 
            record. 
          It is a commonplace that risk is mitigated by diversification and 
            time. There are studies that suggest that extraordinary risk increases 
            with time - more than just a semantic exercise. Risk to an individual 
            investor can also increase with time, as needs and circumstances change 
            with age. 
          Sincerely,
          
          